Abstract: The September 2016 UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was welcomed with much enthusiasm, as the 193 UN member states agreed to meet yet again to negotiate a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. In the year that followed, the process of consultations and negotiations laid out in Annex II of the Declaration moved ahead at full steam. By September 2017, the UN had held five informal thematic sessions and an informal interactive stake-holder meeting; issued multiple summaries, informational notes, and issue briefs; and planned a "stocktaking meeting" for December 2017 in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico (IOM 2017). What will be the substantive outcome of this process? Will the Global Compact provide more and better interstate cooperation on migration, or will states largely ignore it, as they have ignored the three multilateral migration treaties that came before it? We argue that the structure of international cooperation on migration suggests the latter outcome is more likely. This structure consists of five elements: the patterns of migration flows in the post-World War II period, which divide states into countries of origin and countries of destination; the status quo of customary international law that privileges countries of destination; exogenous shocks that trigger changes in the costs of the status quo; the institutionalization of the international system that permits countries of origin to project their preferences onto the international stage; and finally, the ability of countries of destination to ignore these preferences. Examples illustrate the application of the theoretical model. 
INTRODUCTION
The September 2016 UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was welcomed with much enthusiasm, as the 193 UN member states agreed to meet yet again to negotiate a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. In the year that followed, the process of consultations and negotiations laid out in Annex II of the Declaration moved ahead at full steam. By September 2017, the UN had held five informal thematic sessions and an informal interactive stake-holder meeting; issued multiple summaries, informational notes, and issue briefs; and planned a "stocktaking meeting" for December 2017 in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico (IOM 2017) . What will be the substantive outcome of this process? Will the Global Compact provide more and better interstate cooperation on migration, or will states largely ignore it, as they have ignored the three multilateral migration treaties that came before it? We argue that the structure of international cooperation on migration suggests the latter outcome is more likely.
This structure consists of five elements: the patterns of migration flows in the post-World War II period, which divide states into countries of origin and countries of destination; the status quo of customary international law that privileges countries of destination; exogenous shocks that trigger changes in the costs of the status quo; the institutionalization of the international system that permits countries of origin to project their preferences onto the international stage; and finally, the ability of countries of destination to ignore these preferences.
Globalization in the latter half of the 20 th century has knit together economies and societies across national boundaries. This process of globalization has been underpinned by a dense institutionalization of state interactions, yet the degree to which migration flows fit this pattern is highly contested. Alexander Betts (2011) points to a "tapestry" of global governance whereas James Hollifield (2000) claims the migration regime is missing. Empirically we observe a number of bilateral agreements between states; labor migration is sometimes incorporated into regional agreements; and multilateral treaties have been negotiated at the International Labor Organization (ILO) and at the United Nations (UN). Informal forums and dialogues abound.
In this article, we make sense of these disparate views and the variegated empirical landscape. First, we disaggregate international population movements into three types -forced, voluntary, and travel -and focus specifically on voluntary migration flows. 1 Second, we describe the patterns of migration over the last sixty years as characterized by non-reciprocal flows from poorer, less stable countries of origin to wealthier, more stable countries of destination. This pattern tends to generate bilateral externalities that are usually resolved with bilateral agreements rather than regional or multilateral agreements. Third, we argue that the current status quo of customary international law privileges the wealthier and more stable countries of destinationreceiving states -and therefore anticipate that international cooperation will be modest. There are three conditions under which agreements may be reached: when exogenous shocks raise the costs of the status quo for countries of destination; when countries of origin are able to leverage their power in preexisting international institutions; and when migration flows are reciprocal. We provide examples to illustrate our claims.
The article proceeds by first delineating the domain of our theoretical framework, voluntary international migration, and the definitions and assumption from which we proceed.
We then present a bargaining model of interstate negotiations that provides for observable 1 Voluntary international migration accounts for 90% of individuals living outside their country of birth (UNDP 2009). implications. We illustrate the reach of the model by examining the European migrant crisis, the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their families (ICRMW), and the freedom of movement provisions in the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). We conclude by pointing to the opportunities for action at the state and local level.
SCOPE, DEFINITIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
Voluntary migration. Some of the confusion surrounding issues of global migration governance stems from a failure to disaggregate the different types of movement across international borders. According to Rey Koslowski (2011) , the entire picture of global migration governance can be divided into three sub-regimes: the travel or mobility regime, the voluntary migration regime, and the forced migration or refugee regime.
Our focus is on voluntary migration, which encompasses 90% of migrants (roughly 185 million people in 2008) (UNDP 2009 ). This focus presumes a clear distinction between "voluntary" and "forced" migration, yet we know that migrants often have multiple motives for moving and that the legal definition of "refugee," found in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, is so narrow as to leave many migrants unprotected from violence and other threats to their existence. 2 However, this legal fiction is actually important in practice, and migrants are classified according to the legal criteria every day. Most of the individuals caught up in "migration crises," such as the 2015 European migrant crisis, are classified as migrants rather than as refugees, even when they are fleeing war-torn countries, meaning that receiving states can decide to accept or reject them, depending on state preferences. If migrant rights activists and the international community more broadly hope to reduce the human tragedies involved in many migration flows, understanding the prospects for cooperation on voluntary migration is central.
International Cooperation.
There is no standard definition of international cooperation employed in the scholarly literature. However, as the research agenda has deepened over the past three decades, we find that many scholars now focus on international agreements as the marker of international cooperation (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001) . International agreements come in many forms (bilateral, regional, or multilateral) and can be formally binding or simply a memorandum of understanding that does not bind states to the letter of the text. They can create institutional structures or be self-implementing and enforcing. They define a set of behaviors to which state parties agree. International agreements bind states to action that is not unilaterally determined. We take up this position and, for the purposes of this article, define international cooperation as a formal or informal agreement among two or more states that binds states to adopt a joint solution to an issue area that requires action on the part of the signatories.
In contrast to much of the global governance literature, which explicitly incorporates the activities of non-state actors, both domestic and international, we focus solely on agreements between states as the locus of our theoretical and empirical inquiry for two reasons. First, it allows us to simplify our framework while still incorporating the effects non-state actors; they are incorporated into the analysis by way of delineating the costs of the status quo, and changes to it, for states. Those activities are then reflected in the negotiating outcomes should states choose to initiate international negotiations. Second, the practices adopted by non-state actors exist only when those actors have both the preferences and resources to implement those practices, with no scope for enforcement of any type. Although it is not impossible for non-state actors, such as firms or international organizations, to adopt and implement such governance practices, such practices appear largely absent in the international migration arena.
Migration Patterns. We observe that migration patterns in the post-World War II era are characterized by both non-reciprocity and by unique receiving country patterns (UNDP 2009; Hatton 2007 , Sykes 2012 . These characteristics affect the degree of cooperation and the "shape" of cooperation, bilateral, regional or multilateral.
There are complex reasons why individuals choose to migrate (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014 We argue that the central feature that shapes the type of international cooperation that arises is the fact that migration patterns are not only directional but country specific as well.
These patterns are well known to migration experts, and flows can be reasonably well modeled based on geography, historical ties, and wage differentials (Hatton and Williamson 2003a, 2003b The second attribute that we want to point out is the power characteristics of sending and receiving states. By definition, states that attract voluntary migrants are wealthier and more stable than countries of origin. Therefore, we attribute to receiving states greater levels of external power resources-military power, diplomacy, and economic power. These attributes serve to reinforce the preferences of powerful states in the international system.
THE BARGAINING FRAMEWORK
The status quo ante, state preferences, and power. Our bargaining framework begins with the status quo and the preferences of sending and receiving states. To illustrate, we can think about the accepted behavior of states in customary international law related to exit and entry of individuals. Table 2 summarizes customary international law in the area. Table 2 Customary law in international migration 5 The international trade literature looks to the abundance and scarcity of factors of production relative to other states in the international system and labels some countries as labor abundant and capital scarce (with a comparative advantage in labor intensive production) and other countries as capital abundant and labor scarce (with a comparative advantage in capital intensive production). These classifications are uncontroversial (Odell 2000) .
Departure Admission Right to leave any country except when restrictions are provided by law, necessary to protect public order and consistent with other fundamental rights Right to return to one's own country Non-refoulement (of those facing persecution as defined in the UN Refugee Convention (1951, 1967) Family reunion of children Prohibition of arbitrary detention Access to consular protection Prohibition of collective expulsion Source : Chetail 2014, 71. This can be depicted by a two-dimensional issue space as shown in Figure 1 . The most basic rule governing admissions is state sovereignty; the state has the right to turn away individuals seeking entry. This right has been abridged in several ways in customary international law. For example, states are required to allow their own citizens to enter, should they leave the territory of the state. A second abridgement of the right is associated with the 1951 refugee convention that requires signatories to not refoule (turn away) refugees. This requires states to evaluate asylum claims of individuals seeking entry to determine whether they meet the refugee definition. In the two dimensional issue space, the status quo on this dimension would reflect a point close to but not equivalent to total state sovereignty. Conversely, states are required by customary international law to permit their citizens to leave their country, save for concerns with public order. Thus, on the second issue dimension of state sovereignty over exit, the status quo would be reflected by low levels of state sovereignty.
This represents one specific two-dimensional issue space. Generically, each migration issue area has a two (or multidimensional) issue space and a specific status quo ante. We point out that the win-set of the status quo, the policies that both states would prefer to the status quo, is empty if one party prefers the status quo. As illustrated in Figure Because we have defined receiving states as states with relatively more power and more stability, if State A is a receiving state and prefers the status quo, there is a strong likelihood that negotiations to change the status quo will not come to fruition, even though State B is dissatisfied with the status quo. This relationship holds, we argue, both on a bilateral basis and a multilateral basis. That is, States A and B can represent two individual states in the international system or can represent a coalition of all receiving states and all sending states. We conclude, therefore, that when powerful states prefer the status quo ante, international cooperation is less likely to occur. In light of this theoretical framework, we argue there are three conditions under which states will enter the international arena to bargain and to reach an agreement: the presence of exogenous shocks that raise the costs of the status quo; when sending states locate an international institution whose decision rules privilege their number; and when reciprocal flows modify the costs of cooperation. We elaborate each condition below.
Exogenous shocks.
Although powerful states may generally prefer the status quo, exogenous events may change the costs of the status quo and modify the preferences of powerful states. Exogenous events come in many forms. Domestic political actors may create political costs for the government. In the realm of international migration, there are a number of antiimmigrant actors-political parties and interest groups-that may be able to embarrass the government and create electoral costs that the government finds unacceptable. Migrant rights organizations and domestic media outlets may bring attention to migration issues in a way that modifies the government's political calculus. International state and non-governmental actors may also be important in increasing the costs of the status quo to the government in power. Even market forces may create rising costs of the status quo. Peaks and valleys in the state's economic cycle may generate higher demand for migrants that is unattainable through the status quo system or increase calls to reduce the migrant population through methods that are unacceptable in the status quo system. Migrants themselves are also actors. They can mobilize within a polity in a way that creates challenges to the government in power. Or they can increase the costs to the government of the status quo by moving across international borders. Regardless of the source of the exogenous pressures or shocks, as the costs of the current status quo rise, the preferences of the powerful states may change. In this case, the powerful state is likely to initiate negotiations. An example of powerful receiving states entering the international arena in search of an agreement to reduce the costs of the status quo is the European Union, in light of the European migrant crisis. Negotiations with Turkey, the main transit country during that crisis, began in late summer 2015 and only concluded in March 2016. Thus, we argue that when the costs of the status quo ante rise, receiving states are more likely to initiate international negotiations.
Once a powerful state initiates international negotiations, the distribution of power may shift based on each state's best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The concept of "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" is central to the bargaining literature and reflects the idea that parties to the negotiation will examine their alternatives and choose the alternative with the highest payoff. If an alternative to a negotiated agreement provides a higher payoff, then the state will select that alternative. If the negotiated agreement provides the highest payoff, then the agreement will be chosen.
When receiving states experience an exogenous shock, the rising costs of the current status quo make no agreement costly. Time is not on the receiving state's side; the state's leaders need a resolution that reduces their costs. They may have tried unilateral solutions to address the rising costs as alternatives to a negotiated agreement, but these solutions have been ineffective.
They need an agreement. On the other side of the negotiating table, the sending or transit state may well be better satisfied with the status quo than the receiving state. That is, although the sending or transit state prefers a policy position different than the status quo, their position is closer to the status quo than to the position desired by the receiving state. Their best alternative to a negotiated agreement that reflects the preferences of the receiving state may well be the status quo. In this case, they will not choose a negotiated agreement unless they are compensated for their compliance. The availability of alternatives to the negotiated agreement enhances the bargaining power of the sending state. As the receiving state's cost rise, the sending state can extract higher side payments and/or a change in the international rules governing migration.
To continue the same example mentioned above, when the European Union was confronted with a large, and potentially unending, stream of migrants flowing through Turkey in 2015, it negotiated an agreement with Turkey to stop migrant departures-a change to the status quo. In the initial agreement in November 2015, Turkey was able to obtain three billion euros but ultimately realized that it could extract yet larger side payments. The second agreement, which took effect in March 2016, upped the ante to six billion euros-payments promised by the European Union to Turkey to help offset the costs of housing Syrians fleeing civil war within Turkey itself (European Commission 2016).
Institutional power.
Weak states, however, are not totally without resources (Odell 2006) . One of the resources they have garnered in the international system is the power of numbers achieved through institutional rules. An example is the United Nations where sending states, individually less powerful than the receiving states, can vote on provisions in the General Assembly and adopt instruments by majority vote, instruments that the receiving states may not prefer. However, this resource is limited in the sense that states are unbound by treaties that they choose not to ratify. So when the less powerful states can agree on a policy and locate a forum that provides them with institutional power, negotiations may proceed and even result in an international agreement. However, the powerful states are not compelled to ratify the treaty.
On issues of international migration, we argue that if sending states prefer a policy different than the status quo and can organize a coalition that allows them to employ institutional rules to initiate negotiations, then sending states may be able to obtain an international agreement. However, sending states are unlikely to have the power resources to persuade receiving states to modify their opposition to the treaty proposals to change the status quo. An example of this type of event is the negotiation of the UN ICRMW between 1980 and 1990. This form of weak state power can be summarized as follows: When less powerful sending states act as a coalition and find a forum that provides institutional power, bargaining is more likely to occur. However, when an agreement is negotiated without the support of powerful receiving states, those states are unlikely to ratify any negotiated treaty and will not be bound by the treaty provisions.
3. Reciprocal flows. We have described most flows as non-reciprocal, yet there are some exceptions to the rule, cases of reciprocal flows. Specific conditions among a set of states encourage reciprocal migration flows and allow states to improve efficiency in labor markets as well as minimize the potential costs of migration through freedom of movement. Similar levels of wealth, wages, and social benefits ensure that flows will tend toward reciprocity.
6 Full employment mitigates social welfare costs for the state. Linguistic, cultural, and historical similarities also facilitate movement by decreasing the costs of integration for citizens of both home and host societies.
Where flows are reciprocal, freedom of movement enhances labor market efficiency.
When the demand for labor is high, unmet labor market needs can be fulfilled by immigrants;
when the demand for labor is low, unemployed workers can find work abroad. Efficient labor markets generate full employment that reduces the demands on the state for social welfare and enhances state revenue through taxes. Under these conditions, international cooperation may be possible. The translation of this set of preferences into policy is conditional on similar standards of living and on "full" employment.
International freedom of movement is extraordinary in the sense that, with or without border checks, citizens of member states have permission to reside and to take up employment without regard to quotas or labor market conditions of the national labor force. The states party to such agreements relinquish sovereignty over immigration for a select group of countries, as
Britain discovered much to its dismay when immigration from the ten new EU member states in 2004 exceeded expectations by a factor of ten to one (Sherwood 2014 In the first instance, this flood of migrants has exacted a heavy toll on the European Union and its member states. The costs of processing more than a million asylum claims is staggering, as is the cost of food, clothing, housing, and healthcare in the interim and, for those successful claimants, the continued cost of integration. The political price has also been high, Visa-free travel for Turkish citizens is indeed a significant price to pay. Turkey is a country with more than 70 million citizens-larger than any European Union country save 9 There is a discrepancy between the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, which mentions 4.2 billion euros, and the EUTurkey Statement that indicates a prior commitment of 3 billion euros to which the agreement offers an additional 3 billion euros. These are both official documents of the European Union (European Commission 2015 . incorporates virtually all the rights included in the nine other "core" human rights treaties into a single document dealing with foreign residents (Cholewinski 1997; Nafziger and Bartel 1991; Niessen and Taran 1991) .
The story of the shift in migrant protection from the ILO to the United Nations General
Assembly is well known and comes directly out of unhappiness with Convention No. 143 (Böhning 1991 There is a large secondary literature on various aspects of this convention. Our discussion draws on Böhning 1988 Böhning , 1991 Cholewinski 1997; Cholewinski, de Guchteneire, and Pecoud 2009; Edelenbos 2009; Hasenau 1988 Hasenau , 1991 Hune 1985; Lonnroth 1991; Mattila 2000; Nafziger and Bartel 1991; Niessen and Taran 1991; and Taran 2000. States and France, respectively, and were unhappy about the ban on undocumented migration and illegal employment contained in Part I of Convention No. 143 (Böhning 1991) . They led the charge to change the venue for negotiations on migration from the ILO to the UN General
Assembly. The General Assembly of the United Nations was viewed as a more favorable environment for several reasons. UN conventions allow for ratification with reservations whereas ILO conventions do not, which promised a better ratification record than reflected in Convention
No. 143. According to Böhning (1991, 704) , developing countries also wanted to avoid the ILO because: "1. The ILO would not propose anything that contradicted No. 143, which promised to close off remittances from undocumented workers; 2. The UN General Assembly had an automatic developing country majority which the ILO, with its tripartite representation, did not;
3. The ILO gave prominence to independent trade unions, which many developing countries did not like." According to Lonnroth (1991) , these states also wanted to "to achieve a moral condemnation of some of the states of employment."
Central to our argument, we focus on the automatic sending country majority in the General Assembly, which meant that sending states would be able to endorse any negotiated convention without the support of receiving states and therefore would not have to compromise with receiving states on the text of the convention. In terms of our analysis, this is not a developing country coalition per se. Some states in the "Global South" have become receiving states, including the Gulf oil states starting in the 1970s and some East Asian "newly industrializing countries" beginning in the 1980s. Nonetheless, since the early 1950s, the vast majority of sending states are located in the "Global South" and, once they gained independence, they began to outnumber receiving states in the UN General Assembly (Money and Lockhart forthcoming).
Taking up the issue in the UN General Assembly was not a done deal. The emphasis was on spelling out the basic rights of migrant workers who are undocumented or in an irregular situation, and sending states argued that these basic rights lie primarily in the fields of civil and political rights or economic, social, and cultural rights rather than strictly labor rights as is the case of the ILO. Morocco and Mexico worked for several years before obtaining a majority in the General Assembly to support General Assembly Resolution 34/172, which was adopted in December 1979 and established a working group to elaborate a new UN convention on the rights of migrant workers.
The General Assembly working group on migrant workers was formed in October 1980.
The Mexican ambassador to the United Nations was initially elected to chair the working group, a position he retained throughout the decade-long negotiations. The initial working draft was submitted by Mexico and Morocco, reflecting their leadership role and the priority they gave the issue. They were supported by the G77, including states with large emigrant populations.
However, receiving countries in the working group were unhappy with the initial draft, which they viewed as condoning illegal migration and employment. Given that they could not stop the working group from moving forward, a coalition of countries from the northern rim of Mediterranean and Scandinavian governments with social democratic parties worked to provide an alternative draft. 12 This coalition came to be known as the MESCA group, and their draft became the working draft. While attentive to the fundamental human rights of migrants, regardless of their status in the host state, these states had for a "key objective . . . to discourage employers from seeking and hiring workers who are undocumented or in an irregular situation" (Böhning 1991, 702) . The General Assembly finally adopted the International Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Family in 1990, after a full decade of negotiations. However, Böhning (1988, 135) points out that the extension of rights achieved in the ICRMW is nominal.
As of 2017, no major recipient state has signed or ratified the convention, whereas 51 countries of emigration have become party to the convention and an additional 16 states have signed the convention. Adherence to the convention has not produced much in terms of additional protection on the ground for migrant workers, documented or undocumented. 13 In light of the poor ratification and nominal oversight of the states party to it, it would be difficult to call the Convention a success.
This overview of the ICRMW is consistent with our hypotheses. When the status quo is preferred by powerful states, the status quo is likely to remain unchanged. When less powerful states prefer a change in the status quo, their ability to negotiate a multilateral treaty relies on their institutional power to achieve a majority. However, their meager power is insufficient to bring receiving states on board, so that these agreements remain poorly ratified. Over the nearly 100 year history of formal multilateral institutions, few migrant rights conventions have been negotiated, despite an institutional context that acknowledged the significance of migrant rights. Given the similarities of conditions among the member states, these examples fit with our theoretical framework. However, there is another example from the Global South that has been widely overlooked that illustrates well our theoretical propositions: the GCC. 14 The GCC states are better known for the recruitment of workers, both high and low skilled, from other Arab states and, more recently, from Asia, as well as the concerns over the treatment of those workers, particularly low-skilled workers. The freedom of movement of citizens of member states has received little attention.
The cooperation among the six GCC member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) on labor mobility fits well with our model. Yemen. Central to our argument, the wealth disparities and potential for unilateral flows from
Yemen prevented the inclusion of this country in the GCC and in the free movement provisions.
Moreover, freedom of movement has not been extended to citizens of other Arab states which, according to many sources, reflect "centuries of common history, religion, and language [that] have resulted in a high degree of cultural, political and social integration in the Arab region" (Nassar 2010, 11; see also Babar 2011) .
The shock that disrupted the status quo ante was the growing oil wealth of the Gulf countries, especially after the oil price shocks of the 1970s, which catapulted these countries from low to high human development status in just two decades. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 transferred enormous amounts of wealth to these states, which then undertook vast development projects that required significant amounts of labor to implement. However, the populations of these states were small with low labor participation rates. In 1970, the entire region comprised only 7.8 million people, and labor market participation rates were between 30 and 40 percent. Moreover, formal employment was concentrated in the public sector. Thus there was an enormous need for labor to complete the development projects that would diversity these oil economies (Winckler 1997 ). Responding to this demand for labor, the national strategies were twofold: the first was to increase natality and education-to grow their own labor force; the second was to import labor, at least in the interim. These strategies attest to the low unemployment despite the lack of systematic records of unemployment rates during this period, a fact which is confirmed by Winkler (1997 Winkler ( , 2010 . The import of labor included Arabs, especially
Palestinians. But the GCC states ultimately turned to Asians to fill low-skilled labor positions.
The Asian population working in the GCC states rose from 342,589 in 1975 to 3,258,500 ten years later, in 1985 (Winckler 1997) .
In this midst of this economic explosion, the six Gulf oil states negotiated the charter that created the Gulf Cooperation Council. At the same time, the six countries also adopted an economic agreement providing an impetus for economic integration. The Free Trade Agreement took effect in 1983. Article 8 provides for "freedom of movement, work, and residence" as well as "the freedom of engagement in economic activity."
It is difficult to confirm with certainty that freedom of movement is fully implemented.
Nonetheless, several sources appear to agree that freedom of movement is partially or fully implemented (Babar 2011; Haftel 2012) . 15 The implementation of the policy was slow. A protocol was signed in 1993 that ensured equality treatment of GCC nationals, initially in the private sector where nationals were generally employed in very low numbers, followed by a protocol to facilitate employment and free movement. The guarantees of equal access were extended to the public sector in 2000. In 2001, the six states negotiated the Unified Economic Agreement to deepen economic integration. As the population increased and was educated, reflecting earlier policy choices of the state governments, young GCC nationals began to enter the job market; states created labor market "nationalization" policies to ensure that they found employment. The 2001 Unified Economic Agreement ensured that GCC nationals were treated equally in terms of "nationalization targets," goals for employment of nationals. This was followed in 2004 by the extension of social insurance to GCC nationals. Thus, the GCC Supreme Council appears to have taken very seriously efforts to ensure freedom of movement.
Nonetheless, as is characteristic of other regions with freedom of movement, where living standards and wages are similar, the impetus to move is slight. As of 2013, only 35,000 nationals of GCC countries were living in a member state different than their country of origin (GCC 2914).
Our story of the construction of the GCC economic agreement that incorporates freedom of movement points to rising costs associated with labor market shortages that potentially could be filled by citizens of member states. The similarities in wealth when regional cooperation was first established are substantial, despite the small population base, which distorts differences in income. The status of Arabian Peninsula countries is provided in Table 3 . Program 1990 Program , 2001 Program , 2014 In 1985-88, the poorest GCC country (Oman) had a GDP per capita that was 48% of that of the wealthiest (the United Arab Emirates); taking the regional wealth average, which discounts the outlier UAE, the ratio rises to 81%-comparable to the ratios found in regional freedom of movement countries in Europe. What is interesting to note, in addition, is the place of the seventh Arabian Peninsula country that is not blessed with oil wealth. Yemen, the odd country out, had a GDP per capita that was only 12% of the GDP per capita of the wealthiest country. Moreover, even with their populations swollen by an enormous influx of international migrants, Yemen's population was more than half of the GCC's combined population in 1981.
Admitting Yemen, even with the common history, language, and culture, would have generated substantial one-way migratory flows over which individuals states desired unilateral control.
Thus, Yemen was excluded. In later periods, wealth disparities among GCC countries broadened, as oil revenues are subject to economic shocks and because populations are small. Yet a second measure of similarities of living conditions, the Human Development Index, suggests highly similar standards of living (UNDP 2009). Yemen remains the outlier on the Arabian Peninsula and an outcast of the GCC and its freedom of movement provisions. It is interesting to stumble across the little-known policy of freedom of movement in the Global South and to see that it, too, fits well with the theoretical frame generated by the analysis of those dimensions of regionalization in the Global North that privilege freedom of movement.
CONCLUSIONS
Unlike other dimensions of globalization, voluntary international migration is not underpinned by a dense network of international treaties, institutions, or even informal norms. National sovereignty remains the most prominent feature of the international landscape. Caution is required, though, as our model applies only to voluntary migration. Other aspects of international population movement -the travel regime and the refugee regime -do not necessarily reflect these same dynamics.
Voluntary international migration in the past 70 years has been underpinned by the pattern of flows from poorer, less stable countries to wealthier, more stable countries, dividing the globe into sending and receiving states and generating externalities that are predominantly bilateral in nature. We have argued that the status quo ante of customary international law frequently privileges the more powerful receiving states, thereby generating little desire for international cooperation. We describe three conditions likely to generate international negotiations and subsequent cooperation. First, when costs of the status quo ante increase, receiving states broker deals with the sending states that generate the costs; here, sending (or transit) states can extract quid pro quo payments. Note, however, that these agreements tend to restrict rather than facilitate the movement of migrants, unlike similar agreements on trade and foreign direct investment that tend to enhance flows. Second, when sending states locate an international forum where decision rules favor their larger numbers, they negotiate agreements that project their preferences onto the international stage. Receiving states actively negotiate to minimize their commitments but, almost without exception, fail to ratify the agreements that result. This mitigates the impact of these international agreements. Finally, where the standard of living is comparable, thereby generating reciprocal flows, labor market shortages or other exogenous shocks may generate freedom of movement provisions in order to enhance labor market efficiency. We have provided illustrations of each of these phenomena and refer So what, then, should we expect to see emerge from the consultations and negotiations over the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration? Our analysis generates a pessimistic outlook. It is likely that an agreement will be negotiated, but it is also likely that any agreement will be ignored by the states whose implementation is required to bring the agreement to life. However, we are not uniformly pessimistic. Migrant protections can be improved everywhere, but there remains substantial variation among the fates of migrants globally. This variation can be attributed in large part to local conditions. Thus, we suggest that, given the low likelihood of international cooperation on voluntary migration, mobilization should focus at the national and local level. If domestic advocacy groups can use the Global Compact on Migration as a focal point for their own organizing, they may find it to be a useful tool in creating domestic pressure on states to enact national laws that protect migrant populations without presenting the challenge to national sovereignty the international obligations do. But, we do not foresee an increasingly institutionalized migration regime emerging from the process. 
